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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Boeing Company v. Secretary of Air Force, 983 F.3d 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“Board”) entered a final
judgment denying The Boeing Company’s (“Boeing”) motion for summary
judgment. The initial issue stemmed from the legends Boeing marked on the
technical data it delivered to the U.S. Air Force under government contracts.
Following the Board’s ruling, Boeing appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, who reversed the denial of summary judgment, vacated the Board’s
entry of final judgment, and remanded the case back to the Board for further
proceedings.
Facts and Analysis
The controversy in this case arose from a dispute involving “the allocation
of technical data rights between the government and a contractor that delivered
technical data to the government in performance of a government contract.”1
Specifically, the dispute centered around “the legends that a contractor may mark
on any such technical data pertaining to noncommercial items.”2
The relevant statutory framework provided that “the Secretary of Defense
‘shall prescribe regulations to define the legitimate interest of the United States
and of a contractor or subcontractor in technical data pertaining to an item or
process.’”3 However, “‘[s]uch regulations may not impair any right of the United
States or of any contractor or subcontractor with respect to patents or copyrights
or any other right in technical data otherwise established by law.’”4 Additionally,
the regulations must have foreseen development of technical data under different
funding scenarios.5 The court noted that the relevant regulations there governed
“the allocation of technical data rights between contractors and the government
appear in [the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”)]
parts 227 and 252.”6
DFARS 227.7103 “establishe[d] four government licenses for
noncommercial technical data: (1) unlimited rights; (2) government purpose
rights; (3) limited rights; and (4) specifically negotiated license rights.”7 This
clause also allocated to the government the right to reject “nonconforming
markings,” or any markings that are not authorized in the -7013 clause.8
Furthermore, the “regulation also mandates that the government incorporate a
Boeing Co. v. Sec’y of Air Force, 983 F.3d 1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Id.
3
Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2320, Rights in technical data).
4
Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1)).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 1324.
8
Id.
1
2
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particular contract clause into any contract in which noncommercial technical data
will be delivered to the government.”9 The “-7013 clause” (known as such
because the language of the contract clause is found in DFARS 252.227-7013)
also states that any rights not granted to the government are retained by the
contractor.10 This clause also contains the marking requirements relevant to the
issue before the court—it requires contractors to provide instruction for the
placement of restrictive markings, specifies which legends are authorized to be
restricted, and authorizes markings that can be used.11
The court then turned to the facts of the case at hand, noting that Boeing
had entered into two contracts with the Air Force to work on the F-15 Eagle
Passive/Active Warning Survivability System. 12 The government had ‘unlimited
rights’ under both contracts, meaning “that the government has the right to ‘use,
modify, reproduce, perform, display, release, or disclose [the] technical data in
whole or in part, in any manner, and for any purpose whatsoever, and to have or
authorize others to do so.’”13 However, Boeing retained ownership of the
technical data under the contracts.14 Boeing submitted the technical data “with a
legend that purports to describe Boeing’s rights in the data as they pertain to third
parties.”15 The government rejected the data due to the legend and, while a final
decision from a contracting officer was pending, Boeing submitted an alternative
legend, which was also rejected. 16 The final decision (known as a COFD, or a
Contracting Officer Final Decision) rejected the data because Boeing’s legend
was “a nonconforming marking because it is not a format authorized by the
contracts pursuant to Subsection 7013(f).”17
Boeing appealed the COFDs to the Board, moving for an early summary
judgment by claiming that Subsection 7013(f) only applied to “legends that
restrict the government’s rights in technical data” and that the subsection was
“categorically inapplicable to legends like Boeing's that only restrict the rights of
third parties.”18 The Board denied the summary judgment motion, finding that the
subsection listed four specific legends and Boeing’s was not one of them.19
Following the Board’s entry of final judgment, Boeing appealed to the court. 20

9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 1324–25.
13
Id. at 1325 (citing DFARS 252.227-7013(a)(16)).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1326.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
10
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The court noted that the question of the interpretation of Subsection
7013(f) was a question to be reviewed de novo. 21 It began by examining the plain
language of the subsection:
The Contractor, and its subcontractors or suppliers, may only assert
restrictions on the Government's rights to use, modify, reproduce, release,
perform, display, or disclose technical data to be delivered under this
contract by marking the deliverable data subject to restriction . . . Except
as provided in paragraph (f)(5) of this clause, only the following legends
are authorized under this contract: the government purpose rights legend at
paragraph (f)(2) of this clause; the limited rights legend at paragraph (f)(3)
of this clause; or the special license rights legend at paragraph (f)(4) of
this clause; and/or a notice of copyright as prescribed under 17 U.S.C. [§§]
401 or 402.22
After a review of the language, the court agreed with Boeing’s
interpretation of the statute “that the two sentences together are describing the
way in which a contractor “‘may assert restrictions on the Government's
rights.’”23 It found that if the Board’s proposed interpretation of the statute were
the case, the first sentence of the subsection would be entirely unnecessary and
that “the fact that an authorized restriction might also restrict the rights of third
parties in addition to the government's rights is immaterial.”24 The interpretation
the court adhered to for the subsection “also remains faithful to the overall
purpose of the -7013 clause and the broader technical data rights regulations in
DFARS parts 227 and 252.”25 Based on a plain language reading of the statute,
the court accepted that the subsection only applied when a contractor meant to
restrict government rights, as opposed to those of third parties. 26
The court then addressed the government’s remaining arguments based in
other language in the DFARS and “the regulatory history of technical data rights
regulations.”27 The court found that the choice of using the different words
“marking” and “legends” in separate sentences in Subsection 7013(f) “was not
sufficient to destroy the natural relationship between” the two sentences. 28
Furthermore, the court dismissed the government’s argument that the
“authorized” legends mentioned in Subsection 7013(f) were different from
“nonconforming markings” in Subsection 7013(h)(2) because the court had
already concluded that Subsection 7013(f) was not applicable to legends that only
restrict third-party rights.29 The government also attempted to relate the -7013
clause to clauses in DFARS 252.227, but the court responded that “the legends
21

Id.
Id. at 1327 (citing DFARS 252.227-7013(f)).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 1327–28.
25
Id. at 1328.
26
Id. at 1329.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1329–30.
22
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available for contractors to restrict the government's rights in commercial data do
not inform the meaning of the two sentences in Subsection 7013(f),” particularly
because “the default license rights that the government obtains in unmarked
commercial data are far more limited to begin with . . . compared to the default
‘unlimited rights’ that the government obtains in unmarked noncommercial
data.”30
The government finally appealed to regulatory history and the court noted
the extremely heavy burden the government had to meet to utilize regulatory
history in appealing to the court.31 The court then concluded that the government
failed to meet its burden, finding that its reliance on narrowly focused comments
to infer a general principle to interpret other provisions was misplaced and that
none of the regulatory history cited was sufficiently persuasive for the court to
separate the first two sentences of Subsection 7013(f) for interpretation purposes
as the government requested.32
The court then addressed both sides’ policy arguments, noting that
“neither party presents any policy arguments that would be sufficient to overcome
the plain language of Subsection 7013(f)” and that it “decide[d] this case on the
regulation, not policy.”33 However, the court found that its interpretation of
Subsection 7013 served to alleviate some of Boeing’s policy concerns by
“allow[ing] Boeing a bare minimum of protection for the data, namely, the ability
to notify the public of its ownership,” while “[a] contrary interpretation would
result in Boeing de facto losing all rights in any technical data it delivers to the
government.”34 Furthermore, the implication of accepting the government’s
reasoning would lead to contractors negotiating special licenses, rendering the
standardized contract clauses in the DFARS useless.35 The court concluded that
the government’s policy concerns (that allowing contractors to use proprietary
legends would lead to confusion that would significantly negative impact the
government’s licensing rights) were not sufficient to impact the court’s plain
language interpretation of Subsection 7013(f). 36
The government’s final argument claimed that Boeing’s legend restricted
the government’s rights and therefore, it was improper.37 The court noted that it
could not make a decision on the issue because the Board did not address the
factual question at issue in the case, nor could it at the summary judgment
phase.38

30

Id. at 1330.
Id.
32
Id. at 1330–31.
33
Id. at 1331.
34
Id. at 1332.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1332–33.
37
Id. at 1333.
38
Id.
31
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Holding
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s denial
of summary judgment and vacated the Board’s entry of final judgment in this
case.39 The case was remanded back to the Board for further proceedings
consistent with the court’s opinion. 40 Following a plain language analysis of the
subsection in question, the court concluded that Boeing’s argument (that
Subsection 7013(f) applied only where a contractor sought to restrict the rights of
the government) was the correct interpretation of the subsection. 41 Additionally
the court dismissed the government’s arguments on both language grounds and
regulatory history grounds.42 The policy considerations brought by the
government were insufficient to affect the court’s interpretation of Subsection
7013(f).43 The court reversed the denial of summary judgment, but remanded the
case to the Board due to the remaining factual dispute about whether the legend in
question restricted the rights of the government. 44
Impact
This case will prove instructive for how contractors deal with the
government and vice versa. Protecting the rights of contractors in their work is
important, but equally important is the government’s interest in using the data
they are given. In this case, the court takes a step toward clarifying the
regulations found in the DFARS to give contractors more clarity into the marking
requirements and what types of legends are or are not acceptable, but also to
preserve the government’s right to accept data as it sees fit.

39

Id. at 1323.
Id.
41
Id. at 1329.
42
Id. at 1329–31.
43
Id. at 1333.
44 Id.
40
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Canfield Scientific, Inc. v. Melanoscan, LLC, 987 F.3d 1375
(Fed. Cir. 2021)
Synopsis
Canfield Scientific, Inc. (“Canfield”) filed a petition for review of a patent
for an enclosed skin cancer detection system. The United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) determined that the
claims in question were patentable. Following Canfield’s appeal, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed PTAB’s decision, holding that the claims in the
patent were unpatentable because they were obvious.
Facts and Analysis
U.S. Patent No. 7,359,748 (the ’748 patent), owned by Melanoscan, LLC,
encompassed the diagnosis and detection of skin cancer, as well as treatment. 45
Specifically, the patent was meant to protect a device known as the ‘Apparatus for
Total Immersion Photography,’ “an enclosure fitted with cameras and lights
arranged in a manner that “allows for the imaging of total or subtotal nonoccluded body surfaces in order to detect health and cosmetic conditions and
involves the measurement and analysis of an optically depicted image of a
patient's surfaces ....”46 The device as patented contained an enclosure to contain
a person or a part of their body, imaging devices, and lights that imaged a person
to create precise measurements.47 Canfield appealed the decision of the PTAB on
an inter partes review (IPR) of the patent, claiming unpatentability based on
obviousness, claiming that the Board did not consider evidence and arguments
presented by Canfield and “that the Board misapplied the law of obviousness.” 48
The court noted that decisions of the PTAB are subject to de novo review
based on the standard of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).49 Similarly,
“patentability on the ground of obviousness is a question of law . . . and receives
de novo determination on appeal.”50 To determine whether a patent should be
voided on the grounds of obviousness, the court examined four factors: “the scope
and content of the prior art; the differences between the prior art and the claimed
invention; the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention; and objective
considerations such as commercial success, long-felt need, and the failure of
others.”51
To contest its claim, Canfield used five references.52 The court began by
examining the Board’s decision on each of the references. The first, “Voigt,”
described “an enclosure containing cameras and lights, for analyzing and
measuring images on the skin of a patient.”53 Canfield claimed that the only
45

Canfield Sci., Inc. v. Melanoscan, LLC, 987 F.3d 1375, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1377 (citing ’748 patent, col. 1, ll. 7–11).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 1376.
49
Id. at 1378.
50
Id
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
46
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element of Melanoscan’s patent that was not present in Voigt was a plurality of
cameras, therefore Melanoscan’s patent should be considered obvious. 54
Melanoscan responded that Voigt placed the subject against a wall, so it cannot be
“imaged from all sides,” as occurred in their ’748 patent. 55 When examining
Voigt (along with other referenced pieces), the Board did not consider the subject
matter in question obvious.56
Canfield also brought “Hurley,” a “a three-dimensional body-imaging
system having six imaging sensors” positioned in such a way as to image a
person’s entire body.57 When considering this evidence, the Board held that
challenged claims were patentable because a person of ordinary skill would not
combine Hurley and Voigt, as the two systems would not work well together. 58
“Crampton,” another patent brought by Canfield, showed “an apparatus
for imaging the surface of a person and creating an avatar of that person” using
multiple cameras from different angles.59 The Board again found that a person of
ordinary skill would not combine Crampton with Voigt, as Voigt’s system
required participants to be placed against a wall. 60
“Daanen” described a “system that uses 16 to 24 cameras positioned
around the subject, and stated that the use of multiple cameras increases
resolution and reduces shadowing effects.”61 Canfield asserted that this patent
teaches about the use of a panel-camera array and therefore renders it obvious for
the purpose of future patents.62 The Board disagreed, finding that Canfield did
not successfully show how a person of ordinary skill would modify a combination
of Hurley and Voigt to include Daanen’s arrays or why a person of ordinary skill
would use both Hurley’s imaging sensors and Daanen’s arrays.63 Therefore, the
claims were not unpatentable as obvious. 64
Canfield finally brought “Dye” “in combination with Voigt and Crampton
to show obviousness of dependent claims 32 and 46 that recite the use of display
devices to view two- and three-dimensional images and USB ports.”65 In
addressing this particular claim, the Board chose not to discuss dependent claims
separately in its analysis. 66
The court reviewed the Board’s decision that the claims were not obvious.
“‘A claimed invention is unpatentable if the differences between it and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent

54

Id. at 1379.
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1380.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1380–81.
60
Id. at 1381.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1381–82.
63
Id. at 1382.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
55
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art.’”67 In support of their positions, Canfield and Melanoscan presented experts:
Canfield’s expert concluded that a person of ordinary skill would have been
motivated to combine Voigt’s system with Hurley to create a better imaging
system, while Melanoscan’s expert concluded that no motivation to make this
change with a reasonable expectation of success existed. 68 The Board ultimately
ruled for Melanoscan, finding that the patent was not barred by obviousness.69
Canfield asserted that specific claims of the patent were preempted by “the
combined teachings of the prior art” and therefore, “it would have been obvious to
use known or obvious multiple imaging systems in known or obvious enclosures
having the object being imaged at the center of the enclosure.”70 The court noted
that the references included various placements of the subject: against a wall, as in
Voigt, or in the center of the machine, as in Hurley, Crampton, and Daanen. 71
The prior art also shows the cameras both vertically and laterally spaced around
the center.72
The specific claims that Canfield challenged “place[d] the subject within
the enclosure, as in the prior art, and place[d] multiple cameras and lights within
the enclosure, as in the prior art.”73 Based on the references presented by
Canfield, the court concluded that the “subject matter described in claims 1 and
51 would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention.”74 Therefore, the court reversed the Board’s ruling of patentability as
to the claims in question.75
Finally, the court further noted that the Board did not separately analyze
the dependent claims after finding the independent claims patentable. 76 It
therefore vacated the Board’s decision as to the dependent claims and remanded
the case back to the Board. 77
Holding
The court reversed the Board’s decision in regard to the patent in question
in this case.78 When examining expert testimony from both parties in the case, as
well as prior art in the same field, that court concluded that the subject matter in
the contested claims “would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
field of the invention,” and therefore, were unpatentable as obvious. 79
Furthermore, the court remanded the case to the Board to determine whether the
challenged dependent claims were patentable. 80
67

Id. (citing Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
Canfield Sci., Inc. at 1382–83.
69
Id. at 1383.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1384.
68
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Impact
This case is an exhaustive review of the Board’s prior decision on a
contested claim of obviousness in a patent. It is particularly illustrative because
of the court’s thorough examination of the Board’s previous analysis and its
succinct review of the Board’s ruling. The case offers a view of how a court can
disagree with the Board on what a person of ordinary skill would consider nonobvious when developing a new piece of machinery, which is something
individuals or other entities applying for patents should keep in mind.
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City and County of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, 981 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Counties, cities, and states brought multiple separate actions against the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). These suits challenged the validity of
DHS’s rule that expanded the definition of “public charge” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), a provision of which found public charges
inadmissible. The District Court for the Northern District of California granted a
preliminary injunction to enjoin immediate implementation of the rule and the
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington similarly issued a
nationwide preliminary injunction. DHS appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, who found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the rule and that
the preliminary injunctions were properly issued.
Facts and Analysis
The term “public charge” as it is used in immigration law has historically
barred entrance to those who are likely to depend on the government for some
form of subsistence.81 In 2019, DHS issued a new rule that redefined public
charge to include “those who are likely to participate, even for a limited period of
time, in non-cash federal government assistance programs.” 82 These programs
listed in the rule include those meant to assist in providing basic needs (including
food, housing, and medical care) and the rule states that “[f]oreseeable
participation for an aggregate of twelve months in any of the federal programs
within a three-year span renders an immigrant inadmissible as a public charge and
ineligible for permanent resident status.”83
Plaintiffs brought suit, claiming that the likely consequence of this rule
would be increased assistance demands on state and local governments, as the
rule effectively discouraged participation in their federal counterparts. 84 As a
result of the litigation, preliminary injunctions were issued in many districts (both
federal and state), with courts holding that the rule was arbitrary and capricious
and contrary to law.85 Both the Seventh Circuit and the Second Circuit affirmed
the injunctions, holding that the rule’s “definition was both outside any historic or
commonly understood meaning of ‘public charge,’ and arbitrary and capricious,
in concluding that short-term reliance on supplemental benefits made immigrants
dependent on public assistance within the meaning of the statutory public charge
immigration bar.”86 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit reversed the injunction. 87 The

81

City and Cty. of San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Servs., 981
F.3d 742, 749 (9th Cir. 2020).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 750.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. See Cook Cty. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 208, 229, 232–33 (7th Cir. 2020); New York v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2020).
87
City and Cty. of San Francisco at 750.
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Ninth Circuit began its analysis by examining the historical and statutory
background of the public charge provision. 88
Prior to 1996, no statute had ever formally defined the term ‘public
charge.’89 In 1996, Congress added five factors for agencies to consider when
determining whether someone qualifies as a public charge, including age, health,
family status, financial status, and educational level.90 These changes occurred at
the same time as major reforms of various public benefit programs that “made
only non-citizens with five or more years of residency in the United States
eligible for public benefits.”91 The courts were rarely called upon for guidance in
defining ‘public charge,’ except to state that decisionmakers in this area should
look “to the inherent characteristics of the individual rather than to external
circumstances.”92 Due to confusion over the magnitude of change being
implemented, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) issued a
regulatory guidance that defined public charge as a “non-citizen who depends on
the government for survival, either by receipt of income or confinement in a
public institution” and further defined persons “primarily dependent on the
government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either (i) the receipt of public
cash assistance for income maintenance or (ii) institutionalization for long term
care at government expense.”93 The Guidance additionally noted that evidence of
primary dependance would consist of reliance on Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), any state or local cash
assistance program, and programs supporting long-term care of institutionalized
people, all the while excluding any non-cash benefits.94
The court noted that the 2019 Public Charge Rule under review reverses
this previous policy by “making receipt of supplemental benefits the very
definition of a public charge.”95 The current rule defines public charge as “‘an
alien who receives one or more [specified] public benefits ... for more than 12
months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance,
receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).”96 Contrary to the
previous public charge rule, the current Rule instructs that “[a]ny receipt of such a
benefit [including most Medicaid benefits, SNAP benefits, Section 8 housing
vouchers and rental assistance, and other forms of federal housing assistance], no
matter how small, will factor into the public charge determination,”97 as well as

88

City and Cty. of San Francisco at 750.
Id. at 751.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 751–52. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915).
93
City and Cty. of San Francisco at 752 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 28,269).
94
Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 28,269).
95
Id. at 752–53.
96
Id. at 753 (citing Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14,
2019)).
97
Id. (citing Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,501 (Aug.
14, 2019)).
89
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directing officials to consider proficiency with the English language in addition to
other factors.98
The court then considered the district court decisions currently on
99
appeal. The district courts consolidated challenges from many different states,
finding that the rule was likely arbitrary and capricious, that “the plaintiffs had
standing because they had shown that they would likely suffer economic harm
and other costs and that their concerns were within the zone of interests of the
statute,” and that the “new definition of “public charge” was likely not a
permissible interpretation of the statute because it would depart from the
longstanding, settled understanding that a person does not become a public charge
by receiving short-term aid, and must instead demonstrate an inherent incapacity
to provide subsistence.”100 The court also noted that three other circuit courts
have now considered the issues before them before turning to the appeal before
them.101
In regard to plaintiffs’ capacity to maintain the action, DHS alleged that
the injuries brought forth by the states (financial harm caused by immigrants
turning to state and local aid programs as opposed to federal ones) were too
speculative to provide standing. 102 However, the court noted that the rule itself
provided for indirect financial harm to state and local aid programs and that the
record showed that federal entities were experiencing disenrollment at the current
time.103 Although DHS claimed that the rule would ultimately lead to cost
savings, the court rejected that argument, finding that it did not adequately
address the immediate financial injury the plaintiffs would suffer.104
DHS also disputed the plaintiffs’ standing to bring a claim under the APA,
claiming that the plaintiffs were not within the zone of interest of the statute as
required by precedent.105 However, the court noted that to accept DHS’s
contention (that the entities within the zone of interest and therefore with standing
to bring a claim include only the federal government and individuals looking to
immigrate) would “practically insulate [permissible immigration litigation against
the government] from many challenges to immigration policy and procedures,
even those violating the Constitution or federal laws.”106 The court concluded
that the “interests of the plaintiffs in preserving immigrants’ access to
supplemental benefits is within the zone of interests protected by the statute” and
therefore, upheld the district courts’ decision that the plaintiffs had standing to
bring suit.107
98

Id. (citing Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,503–04
(Aug. 14, 2019)).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 754.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 755 (citing Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,
567 U.S. 209, 224 (2012).
106
Id.
107
Id.
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The court then moved to an analysis of whether the rule was contrary to
law by hearing argument on whether the rule was a reasonable interpretation of
‘public charge.’108 Applying a historical perspective, the court acknowledged that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on this point, citing the holdings of other
circuit courts on the same issue.109 In its appeal before the court, DHS relied on
“the affidavit of support provisions to contend that the Rule is consistent with the
statutory public charge bar.”110 However, the public charge bar and the affidavit
of support provisions are unrelated, as they are parts of two separate acts, so the
court gave little merit to this argument. 111 Additionally, DHS identified a
“provision that permits entry of battered women without regard to receipt” of
public benefits, claiming that it reflects “Congress’s belief that the receipt of any
public benefits would be a consideration in admission for most other public
charge determinations.”112 The court refuted this argument by noting that
Congress could have enacted this directly, rather than through an ancillary
provision, and ultimately concluded that “the plaintiffs have demonstrated a high
likelihood of success in showing that the Rule is inconsistent with any reasonable
interpretation of the statutory public charge bar and therefore is contrary to
law.”113
The court then analyzed the district courts’ finding that the plaintiffs were
likely to succeed on their claims that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. 114
“The plaintiffs argue that DHS failed the test in three principal respects: It failed
to take into account the costs the Rule would impose on state and local
governments; it did not consider the adverse effects on health, including both the
health of immigrants who might withdraw from programs and the overall health
of the community; and it did not adequately explain why it was changing the
policy that was thoroughly explained in the 1999 Guidance.”115
In regard to the financial costs, the court noted that during the comment
period, “DHS provided no analysis of the effect of the Rule on governmental
entities like the plaintiffs in these cases.” 116 There was no reason for DHS not to
engage the evidence or examine the data presented to them, as precedent states
“that an agency may not, without analysis, cite even “‘substantial uncertainty’ …
as a justification for its actions.”117 Furthermore, the DHS ignored comments
from health professionals detailing the negative impact the rule would have on
public health as a whole, making the rule a decision that runs counter to evidence
provided and therefore arbitrary and capricious. 118 DHS also did not explain the
108
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sudden change in policy as compared to the 1999 Guidance. 119 The Supreme
Court had previously rejected a reversal in policy without an explanation of why
the change was necessary and the court noted that DHA was required to provide a
“more detailed justification” for the rule. 120 For these reasons, the court
concluded “that the Rule's promulgation was arbitrary and capricious as well as
contrary to law within the meaning of the APA.”121
The court then considered the remaining factors necessary for an
injunction—irreparable harm and the balance of equities and public interest. 122
With regard to the first factor, the court found that the economic harm suffered by
immigrants’ dependance on state and local aid programs (as opposed to federal
programs) constituted more than speculative harm or future injury, as claimed by
DHS.123 Similarly, in regards to the second factor, the court found the district
courts did not err in finding that the public interest merited an injunction because
of the adverse health consequences due to disenrollment from federal programs
likely to be incurred by not only the immigrant population, but the population of
the plaintiffs as a whole. 124
However, despite finding the injunction appropriate as a whole, the court
declined to affirm the portion of the Eastern District’s injunction that applied it
nationwide, reasoning that a nationwide injunction was inappropriate because “the
impact of the Rule would fall upon all districts at the same time, and the same
issues regarding its validity have been and are being litigated in multiple federal
district and circuit courts.”125 The court did not address the plaintiffs’ claim that
the rule violated the Rehabilitation Act (banning discrimination based on
disabilities) because it found that the rule violated the APA on its own.126
Holding
The court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claim
because their injuries were not too speculative, as alleged by DHS.127
Additionally, the plaintiffs’ interests properly rested within the zone of interests
protected by the statute, giving them standing under the APA.128 The court held
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the rule did not use a
reasonable definition of the term ‘public charge.’ 129 Furthermore, because “DHS
adopted the Rule, reversing prior, longstanding public policy, without adequately
taking into account its potential adverse effects on the public fisc and the public
welfare,” the court concluded that the rule was both arbitrary and capricious and
119
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contrary to law under the APA. 130 The court also found that the other two factors
for granting an injunction – the presence of irreparable harm and the balancing of
public interests – merited the granting of an injunction.131 Therefore, the orders
granting the injunctions were affirmed. 132 However, because the same issues
before the court were still in litigation in other courts across the country, the court
vacated the lower court’s decision to issue the injunction on a nationwide basis. 133
Impact
This case is one of many cases in the courts discussing the change to the
definition of ‘public charge’ and the new rule putting it in place. If enacted, the
new rule would undoubtedly have a drastic impact on the immigration process
and the lives of immigrants already in the United States. The issues may resolve
on their own with the change in administration, but until then, the injunction
remains in place in the Ninth Circuit and the new rule cannot be utilized.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d
715 (9th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Seila Law LLC was under investigation by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) for alleged violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule
while providing debt-relief services to clients. The CFPB filed a petition to
enforce a civil investigative demand (CID). The United States District Court for
the Central District of California granted the petition and ordered Seila Law to
comply with the CID and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed on
appeal. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, and on appeal once
again, the Court of Appeals held that the current Director of the CFPB validly
ratified the CID and that ratification adequately addressed all relevant
constitutional injuries that the law firm may have suffered.
Facts and Analysis
The CFPB issued a CID to Seila Law LLC in February 2017, requesting
the production of documents and answers to interrogatories. 134 After Seila Law
refused to comply, the CFPB filed a petition to enforce the CID in June 2017. 135
The appeal made it up to the Supreme Court, who concluded that “the statute
establishing the CFPB violated the Constitution's separation of powers by placing
leadership of the agency in the hands of a single Director who could be removed
only for cause.”136 However, the Supreme Court concluded that “the for-cause
removal provision could be severed from the rest of the statute and thus did not
require invalidation of the agency itself.”137 The case was then remanded back to
the Ninth Circuit to determine “‘whether the civil investigative demand was
validly ratified’ by former Acting Director Mick Mulvaney during his year-long
stint in that office.”138
Seila Law’s main assertion of constitutional injury stemmed from agency
structure: namely, “that the agency issued the CID and pursued its enforcement
while headed by a Director who was improperly insulated from the President's
removal authority.”139 However, this issue was addressed by the validation of
CFPB’s current director, Kathleen Kraninger, who was properly aware that she
could be removed from her position by the President at will. 140 Seila Law then
asserted two additional arguments challenging the validity of the ratification. 141
Seila Law first attempted to contend that the Director “could not validly
ratify the CFPB's earlier actions because the agency lacked the authority to take
134
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those actions back in 2017.”142 Seila Law cited precedent in Federal Election
Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund, where the Supreme Court held that
“‘it is essential that the party ratifying should be able not merely to do the act
ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the time the ratification was
made.’”143 Seila Law claimed that with the for-cause removal provision
remaining in place, the CFPB was unlawfully utilizing executive power, rendering
all prior agency actions void and incapable of being ratified. 144
The Ninth Circuit found that another case, CFPB v. Gordon, forecloses
Seila Law’s reasoning here.145 In a similar set of circumstances, the court held
that any constitutional defect was limited to an appointed official, rather than the
agency as a whole.146 Therefore, CFPB retained the authority to bring
enforcement actions.147 The court concluded that the same was true in this case,
as noted by the Supreme Court when hearing this case.148 “Nothing in the Court's
decision suggests that it believed this defect rendered all of the agency's prior
actions void. Indeed, had that been the Court's view, it presumably would have
ordered the dismissal of this proceeding rather than remanding for us to consider
whether the agency's actions relating to the CID had been validly ratified.”149
Gordon, taken together with another case on the same issue, Federal Election
Commission v. Legi-Tech, Inc., affirmed that ratification is appropriate to remedy
both structural, separation-of-powers defects and defects involving the
Appointments Clause.150 Thus, the court concluded that a constitutional defect in
CFPB’s composition did not force all agency actions to be void. 151
Seila Law’s second argument asserted that Director Kraninger’s
ratification (which occurred in July 2020) occurred “outside of the limitations
period for bringing an enforcement action against Seila Law.” 152 In support of
this point, Seila Law relied on NRA Political Victory Fund, which held “that the
Solicitor General could not validly ratify the filing of an unauthorized petition for
certiorari when the attempted ratification occurred after the time for filing the
petition had already run.”153
When considering the relevant statute of limitations regulations (here,
three years after the date of discovery of the violation), the court dismissed this
argument on the grounds that the statutory limitation period in question applied
only to bringing an enforcement action, which had not yet occurred. 154 At that
point in the CFPB’s investigation, it was impossible to determine whether an
142
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action would be timely and, regardless, whether or not a valid statute-oflimitations defense would apply to a future enforcement action “has no bearing on
the validity of Director Kraninger’s ratification.”155 Because Seila Law raised the
potential statute-of limitations issue prematurely, it could not be considered in the
case before the court.156
Holding
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the CID and any ongoing
attempts to enforce it was validly ratified by Kathleen Kraninger, the CFPB’s
current director, while knowing that she could be removed from her position with
or without cause.157 Kraninger’s proper ratification of the CID effectively
remedies constitutional injuries that Seila Law may have suffered due to the
structure of the CFPB.158 The court dismissed Seila Law’s argument that the
improperly appointed Director negated the agency’s authority as a whole, citing
numerous cases to the contrary. 159 Seila Law’s second argument, that the
ratification of the CID occurred outside of the limitations period for bringing an
enforcement action, was also dismissed, as no enforcement action had actually
been brought, so there was no statute of limitations issue in this case. 160
Impact
This case further illuminates principles first addressed in cases mentioned
here, such as Gordon and NRA Political Victory. The court emphasizes here that
although agency structure may pose a constitutional problem for certain actions
the agency takes, it does not per se invalidate a later ratification of those actions.
Because an agency retains the authority to take actions even when a certain
official in the agency does not, agencies can continue their day-to-day routines
without fear that their actions will be entirely voided later on, provided they are
confident of a ratification of those actions from a newly-appointed official when
the time comes.
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France v. United States, 981 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Dillinger, a foreign exporter, filed suit to challenge the Department of
Commerce’s (“Commerce”) conclusion in an antidumping investigation. The
products involved were alloy steel and carbon cut-to-length (“CTL”) plates
imported from France. After the Court of International Trade (“Trade Court”)
remanded and later sustained the remand redetermination, Dillinger appealed. On
review, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the costs were
improperly allocated during a calculation of normal value, that the reliance on the
method of average-to-transaction was permissible here, and that the level of trade
adjustment present was not warranted.
Facts and Analysis
In commerce, “‘[d]umping occurs when a foreign firm sells a product in
the United States at a price lower than the product’s normal value.’” 161 When
there is evidence that dumping is occurring, “Commerce is required to impose
antidumping duties on imported merchandise that is being sold, or is likely to be
sold, in the United States as less than fair value to the detriment of a domestic
industry.”162
Commerce began an antidumping duty investigation into carbon and alloy
steel CTL plates from France in April of 2016. 163 In the course of this
investigation, Commerce selected Dillinger (a producer of CTL plate from
Europe) as a mandatory importer respondent and assigned the company a 6.15%
antidumping margin.164 Dillinger appealed to the Trade Court, which on review
sustained Commerce’s decision but remanded issues to Commerce. 165 The Trade
Court then sustained the remand results and the antidumping margin. 166 Dillinger
appealed the judgment, claiming that Commerce erred in its antidumping
determination.167
The Federal Circuit Court reviewed the Trade Court’s decision de novo. 168
It addressed Dillinger’s three issues on appeal, beginning with the “argument that,
in calculating normal value, Commerce improperly allocated costs between
Dillinger's non-prime and prime products based on Dillinger's books and records,
which allocate cost based on likely selling price rather than actual cost.”169
Dillinger’s products consisted of two types of plates, prime (plate sold with a
warranty) and non-prime (plates that do not meet the standard of prime and thus,
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cannot be sold with a warranty). 170 In its books, Dillinger reported costs of nonprime plate as “equal to the average actual cost of all plate” because it is not any
less costly to produce, despite the inability to sell it at full price. 171 Upon review,
Commerce “adjusted Dillinger’s reported costs for non-prime plate . . . and
allocated the differences to the costs for Dillinger’s prime plate,” which
effectively reduced the cost of non-prime plate and increased the cost of prime
plate.172 In response, Dillinger “argue[d] that Commerce's reliance on Dillinger's
books and records was improper because the books and records were not based on
the costs associated with the production of its products.”173
After an analysis of the relevant statutory language of 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(f)(1)(A), the court concluded that the section required “‘that reported costs
must ‘normally’ be used’ only if (1) ‘they are “based on the records ... kept in
accordance with the [GAAP]”’ and (2) ‘“reasonably reflect” the costs of
producing and selling the merchandise.’”174 The court noted that the dual nature
of the test was apparent from the plain language of the statute and cited
precedential cases that instructed its actions in this area. 175 Because “Commerce
relied on the likely selling price of non-prime plate in its determination of costs,”
its reliance was therefore impermissible. 176
Commerce responded by claiming that the IPSCO case should not govern
because the Tariff Act has since been amended. 177 However, the court noted that
during the amendment process, Congress did not repeal either section the court
relied on in deciding IPSCO or intended in any way for the additions made to
overrule IPSCO.178 Rather, the legislative history indicated that Congress
intended for Commerce to continue to calculate costs as it normally did, despite
the amendments to the Tariff Act. 179 Specifically, Congress directed Commerce
to “rely on a producer or exporter’s books and records if they . . . reasonably
reflect the costs of production.”180 Here, Commerce relied on Dillinger’s books
based on the ‘likely selling price,’ rather than the costs of production. 181 Due to
this, the court ultimately vacated the Trade Court’s ruling and remanded for
further proceedings “[b]ecause Dillinger's books and records did not reasonably
reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the merchandise as
required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(f).”182
Dillinger’s second argument asserted that “Commerce’s use of the
average-to-transaction method in determining the dumping margin was
170
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improper.”183 Commerce determines the dumping margin (the amount that the
normal value exceeds the export price of merchandise) by using one of three
methods: the average-to-transaction method, the transaction-to-transaction
method, or the average-to-average method.184 Commerce applied the average-totransaction method here, which is used if “‘there is a pattern of export prices . . .
for comparable merchandise that differ significantly among purchasers, regions,
or periods of time.’”185 This provision largely addresses situations where there is
targeted dumping, or where an exporter sells a product at low prices to specific
customers or regions, while also selling at a higher price to others. 186 The court
noted that Commerce typically used a barrage of standard tests to determine
whether a pattern of export prices that differed significantly existed, including
Cohen’s d test (which compared the weighted-average prices of a test group and a
comparison group) and the ratio test (which calculated sales value for any test
groups that passed the Cohen’s d test), and that it did the same in this case. 187
Here, Commerce concluded that there was a pattern of prices that differed among
time periods, regions, or purchasers, which merited the use of the average to
transaction method.188
Dillinger challenged this determination in two ways.189 It first claimed
that Commerce’s ratio test aggregated sales across categories, which cannot be
done in establishing a pattern.190 However, the court found that aggregation is not
inconsistent with the relevant statutory language, which does not say how
Commerce should determine a pattern. 191 Because Chevron permits agencies to
answer in a reasonable manner when the statutory language is silent in regard to a
specific issue, the court concluded the Commerce’s interpretation of ‘pattern’ was
reasonable.192 Dillinger’s reliance on an opposite conclusion from the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was improper because the WTO’s decisions are not
binding on the United States, nor its courts.193
Dillinger also argued that Commerce’s use of the Cohen d test was
improper because it failed to consider that Dillinger’s products were custommade, which should have required the use of the average-to-average test.194
However, the court found that there was no obligation in the statute for
Commerce to consider custom products different, provided that a comparison is
made between comparable merchandise. 195 As Dillinger failed to show that
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Commerce failed to use ‘comparable merchandise’ in making its determination,
the court found no error in Commerce’s choice of test in this case.196
Dillinger’s final argument asserted that “that Commerce erred in
determining that Dillinger's factory sales and sales from its affiliated service
centers constituted a single level of trade in France and thus concluding that a
level of trade adjustment was not warranted.”197 Specifically, Dillinger claimed
that because it makes sales from its factories to distributors and from affiliated
service centers to other customers, Commerce erred in finding “that inventory
maintenance performed on service center sales did not require a finding of a
separate level of trade.”198 However, the court found that Commerce’s
determination that “inventory maintenance alone did not make a substantial
difference between the selling activities commonly performed by Dillinger's
factories and service centers” was in accordance with relevant law and statutory
language. 199 Furthermore, Commerce properly determined that any additional
activities performed at Dillinger’s service centers (such as cutting and sawing
plate) were not selling functions and should have no impact on its analysis. 200
Holding
When looking at the Trade Court’s decision, the court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded the decision. 201 Because Dillinger’s books did not
reflect costs of production and sale of their products, but rather the ‘likely selling
price’ of the plate they produced, the court vacated the Trade Court’s decision on
this issue.202 However, the court concluded that Commerce’s use of the averageto-transaction method was appropriate in this case, despite Dillinger’s attempts to
argue otherwise.203 Finally, the court found that Dillinger’s inventory
management activities did not make a sufficient difference in Commerce’s
analysis.204 However, the court remanded the case to the Trade Court to
“recalculate the dumping margin consistent with this opinion.” 205

196

Id.
Id.
198
Id. at 1327.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 1320.
202
Id. at 1324.
203
Id. at 1326.
204
Id. at 1327.
205
Id.
197

41-1

JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIARY

Impact
This case illustrates the relationship between foreign companies under
investigation and the Department of Commerce. Although the court gives
deference under Chevron to many decisions made by the Department of
Commerce, their analyses are not impervious to challenge. The antidumping
investigations conducted by the Department of Commerce are undoubtedly
complex, but the court’s relationship with the Trade Court and with the
Department itself allows challenges to be analyzed fairly and succinctly, as
illustrated in this opinion.

264

SPRING 2021

LEGAL SUMMARIES

265

Hassan v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 2021)
Synopsis
Plaintiff was a noncitizen of the United States and a native of Somalia. He
petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmation of
an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his request to defer his removal under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the IJ and BIA properly considered the aggregate risk of torture to
Hassan in denying his CAT relief, and that substantial evidence supported the
conclusion that Hassan was unlikely to be tortured by the Somali government or
terrorist organizations and that the Somali government was unlikely to participate
in any torture of Hassan. Based on these findings the Court of Appeals denied the
petition.
Facts and Analysis
In 2001, Mohamud Mohamed Hassan, a Somali native, used a false
passport to enter the United States, causing the Department of Homeland Security
to seek his removal.206 Following an order from an IJ to remove Hassan to
Somalia and an affirmative decision from the BIA, the court denied Hassan’s
petition for review.207 The BIA granted a motion to reopen the case, where
Hassan argued that if removed to Somalia, he was likely to be tortured. 208 He
petitioned for a deferral of removal under CAT, which the IJ denied and the BIA
affirmed.209 Hassan then petitioned the court to review the decisions.210
Hassan claimed that “the Somali government would torture him for
belonging to a minority clan and that Al-Shabaab (a terrorist organization) would
torture him for minority-clan membership, being ‘westernized,’ and having been
on a failed repatriation flight.”211 However, the IJ and BIA found that torture of
Hassan was unlikely and “alternatively found that any torture by Al-Shabaab
would not trigger CAT relief because it would not be done with the Somali
government's acquiescence and that Hassan could avoid any risk of torture from
Al-Shabaab by relocating to Mogadishu.”212
Hassan challenged these findings on multiple fronts.213 He first claimed
that the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions that his clan, the Begadi, was not a minority
clan was incorrect.214 However, the court found that substantial evidence existed
that “the Begadi clan is actually a sub-clan of a ‘noble’ clan with major
representation in the Somali government.” Because the evidence Hassan cited to
the contrary was not sufficiently compelling (he cited only his own testimony and
206
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inapposite affidavits), the court found that the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusion on this
point was reasonable.215
Hassan next challenged “the IJ's and BIA's conclusions that any torture by
Al-Shabaab does not qualify for CAT relief because the Somali government
would not acquiesce in such torture.”216 The court noted that the standard for
government acquiescence in torture “‘centers upon the willfulness of a
government’s non-intervention’” and that “‘[a] government does not acquiesce in
the torture of its citizens merely because it is aware of torture but powerless to
stop it, but it does cross the line into acquiescence when it shows willful blindness
toward the torture of citizens by third parties.’”217 When applying those concepts
to the current case, the court found that the Somali government was not ignoring
the torture, but was rather attempting to combat it. 218 It found Hassan’s
arguments—first that the government’s amnesty program for Al-Shabaab
members demonstrated acquiescence, and second that the government worked
together with Al-Shabaab to torture people—unconvincing.219 Furthermore,
Hassan did not explain how the Somali government was likely to acquiesce in his
own torture, as required to attain CAT relief. 220 Hassan’s assertion “that the
Somali government has been unable to control Al-Shabaab” was alone
insufficient to establish acquiescence. 221
Hassan’s final argument asserted that the “IJ and BIA applied the wrong
legal standard by failing to consider his aggregate risk of torture and, instead,
denied him relief solely because no single risk factor demonstrated a likelihood of
torture.”222 The court disagreed with his claim, finding that the IJ and BIA
properly considered all evidence of the potential for future torture and that
because the IJ and BIA considered all factors together, addressing factors
individually was not inconsistent with analyzing risk in the aggregate. 223 Because
“precedent does not require a separate or lengthy aggregation analysis,” the court
found that the BIA and IJ properly considered the risk of torture, and thus, denied
Hassan’s petition.224
Holding
The court upheld the decision of the IJ and the BIA in regard to Hassan’s
225
case.
The court first concluded that the conclusion that Hassan’s clan was not
considered a minority clan in Somalia was backed by sufficient evidence. 226
Furthermore, the court disagreed with Hassan’s various arguments that the Somali
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government actively acquiesced in torture to the extent that he qualified for CAT
relief.227 Finally, because there was no requirement that the IJ or BIA consider
the aggregate risk of torture in a separate analysis, the court was convinced that
their consideration of the relevant risk factors was proper in their denial of
Hassan’s petition.228
Impact
This case provides further guidance on interpretation of immigration
decisions involving CAT. Specifically in this opinion, the court elaborates that no
separate aggregation analysis of all risk factors is required, provided that all
factors are analyzed sufficiently in the decision, as well as addressing the standard
of evidence required to prove any factual bases required for CAT relief. This case
will undoubtedly come into play when future CAT decisions are appealed in the
8th Circuit.
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Innova Solutions, Inc. v. Baran, 983 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2020)
Synopsis
Plaintiff, a technology company, appealed a decision of the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that denied their petition for a
specialty occupation visa for an Indian citizen. The citizen was a computer
programmer with a bachelor’s degree and USCIS denied the specialty occupation
visa, finding that a bachelor’s degree was not normally required for computer
programmers. Following the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
USCIS, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling on the
ground that the denial was arbitrary and capricious.
Facts and Analysis
Plaintiff, a technology company operating in areas such as data analytics
and cloud storage, wanted to hire Dilip Dodda (an Indian citizen) to work as a
computer programmer.229 They thereafter petitioned for an H-1B “specialty
occupation” visa for Dodda, which required plaintiff “to establish that the position
required ‘theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized
knowledge’ and that ‘[a] baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is
normally the minimum requirement for entry into the particular position.’”230 In
evaluating the petition, “USCIS relied on the Department of Labor's Occupational
Outlook Handbook (OOH) as an ‘authoritative source’ to determine whether
Dodda's position “normally” requires a bachelor's degree.”231 The OOH provided
that a bachelor’s degree is the typical level of education for a computer
programmer, but some employers hire workers with an associate’s degree only. 232
However, USCIS found that the plaintiff did not show that “a computer
programmer qualified as a specialty position.” 233 They stated:
While the OOH indicates that most computer programmers obtain a
degree (either a bachelor's or an associate degree) in computer science or a
related field, the OOH does not state that at least a bachelor's degree or its
equivalent in a specific specialty is normally the minimum required for
entry into the occupation. Further, the OOH also indicates that employers
value computer programmers who have experience, which can be obtained
through internships.234
Upon receiving the denial, the plaintiff challenged it under section 706 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming that the denial was arbitrary
and capricious.235 The district court granted summary judgment for USCIS,
229
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finding that “‘the OOH description for the Computer Programmer occupation
does not describe the normal minimum educational requirements of the
occupation in a categorical fashion’ because ‘at least some Computer Programmer
positions may be performed by someone with an associate's degree.’”236 The
plaintiff then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 237
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s ruling de novo, noting that
under the APA, its task on appeal was to determine whether an agency action was
arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law. 238 Upon examination, the
court concluded that USCIS’s decision in light of the OOH’s guidance was
arbitrary and capricious. 239 USCIS’s decision stated that “the OOH does not state
that at least a bachelor's degree or its equivalent in a specific specialty is normally
the minimum required for entry into the occupation.”240 The court acknowledged
that the OOH did not use the exact language in the H-1B regulation (as it was
written by a different agency), but reasoned that the OOH clearly stated that a
“bachelor’s degree is not only common but typically needed.” 241 Because there is
no rational relation between USCIS’s source and USCIS’s decision in this case,
the court found that “USCIS’s contrary reasoning is beyond saving.” 242 The court
dismissed USCIS’s argument that there was ‘space’ (a difference in meaning)
between the words “normally, most, and typically,” finding that “that space is at
best molecular and nowhere near big enough for the doublespeak freight train that
USCIS tries to drive through it.”243
USCIS also attempted to cite OOH language stating that “some employers
hire workers with an associate’s degree.” 244 However, the court found that “the
fact that some computer programmers are hired without a bachelor's degree is
entirely consistent with a bachelor's degree ‘normally [being] the minimum
requirement for entry.’”245 The court noted that “[w]hile agencies are entitled to
deference in interpreting their own ambiguous regulations, this regulation is not
ambiguous and deference to such an implausible interpretation is unwarranted.”246
Here, the court found USCIS’s interpretation of the language unreasonable,
rending the decision arbitrary and capricious. 247
USCIS also argued that the OOH alone was not an authoritative source on
whether an occupation can be considered a specialty occupation because in
instances such as here, it was not a sufficient source of information. 248 The court
rejected these arguments for two reasons.249 First, it noted that USCIS improperly
236
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equates the term ‘normally’ with the term ‘always’ by “demanding additional
proof anytime some positions within an occupation require less than a bachelor's
degree.”250 Second, the court said that by USCIS’s own standard, no additional
proof about whether a position falls into a specialized sub-group is required.251
[T]he district court's ruling functionally requires visa petitioners to
demonstrate that their particular position actually requires a bachelor's
degree. That approach is plainly inconsistent with the language of the first
regulatory criterion and USCIS practice. Moreover, it conflates the first
criterion, which only asks whether the position normally requires a
bachelor's degree, and the third criterion, which asks whether the
employer normally requires a bachelor's degree for the position. 252
The court additionally found that USCIS’s decision ran contrary to the
evidence presented to it, rendering it arbitrary and capricious. 253 The decision by
USCIS mischaracterized the OOH by stating that “‘the OOH indicates that most
computer programmers obtain a degree (either a bachelor's or an associate's
degree) in computer science or a related field.’”254 However, “[t]he OOH did not
state that most computer programmers have either a bachelor's or an associate's
degree, but rather that most ‘have a bachelor's degree in computer science or a
related subject.’”255 The court noted that although a purely factual error is not
necessarily enough to render a decision arbitrary and capricious on its own, in this
case, “this serious misconstruction of the only source considered was arbitrary
and capricious.”256
Finally, USCIS did not consider key evidence in coming to its decision. 257
The court stated that language in the OOH listing “‘bachelor’s degree’ as the
‘[t]ypical level of education that most workers need to enter this occupation’” was
not found anywhere in USCIS’s decision.258 “USCIS's failure to consider
evidence so central to the inquiry” also led the court to conclude that its decision
in this case was arbitrary and capricious. 259
Holding
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court’s denial of the plaintiff’s
challenge to USCIS’s refusal of an H-1B temporary worker visa and remanded
the case back to the lower court. 260 It did so because the decision of USCIS in
this case was arbitrary and capricious when examining the relevant guidelines in
250
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the OOH.261 Because the court found that USCIS’s interpretation of the relevant
language of the OOH was unreasonable, it found that the decision rendered here
was arbitrary and capricious.262 It additionally ruled the decision arbitrary and
capricious because in evaluating the case, USCIS’s decision ran counter to the
evidence presented to it and in coming to that decision, USCIS failed to consider
key evidence.263 For these reasons, the court reversed the lower court’s grant of
summary judgment.264
Impact
The Ninth Circuit expressed in this opinion an attitude of strictness in
regard to this and future USCIS decisions. Decisions that play on semantics and
that mischaracterize and ignore key evidence will not be upheld by the court.
This decision should give hope both to companies applying for H-1B visas for
employees and to immigrants applying for visas of varying types that a court is
ready and willing to hear their appeal should the decision rest on grounds that are
seemingly dubious.
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Zellweger v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1251 (7th Cir. 2021)
Synopsis
Zellweger brought an action for judicial review of the denial of his
application for disability insurance benefits by the Commissioner of Social
Security. Upon initial review, the district court reversed the denial. Following an
appeal by the Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the Commissioner’s analysis was adequate and reversed the decision of the
lower court.
Facts and Analysis
Michael Zellweger, a man suffering from a spinal disorder, applied for
Social Security disability benefits under Listing 1.04 in the Listing of
Impairments used by the Social Security agency. 265 He was suffering from
cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease that required two spinal surgeries,
in 2007 and 2010, respectively.266 The Listing in question identified
“impairments that are considered to be so severe as to be per se disabling.” 267
Upon review, an administrative law judge (ALJ) utilized a five-step decisionmaking process to determine whether Zellweger could receive benefits.268
At step one the ALJ determines whether the claimant has engaged in
gainful employment between his alleged disability-onset date and the
expiration of his insurance. At step two the ALJ considers whether the
claimant suffers from a serious impairment or combination of
impairments. At step three the ALJ decides whether the claimant has an
impairment that meets or equals one of the categories listed in the agency's
Listing of Impairments at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If the criteria
for a listing are met, the claimant is per se disabled. If not, the decision
process moves on and the ALJ considers the claimant's residual functional
capacity (“RFC”)—that is, his ability to work despite his impairments. At
step four the ALJ determines whether the applicant can perform his past
relevant work in light of his RFC. Finally, at step five the ALJ decides
whether the claimant can do some other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. 269
When examining Zellweger’s case for steps one and two, the ALJ properly
concluded that he had not worked since his onset date and suffered from diabetes,
carpal tunnel syndrome, and cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease. 270 In
step three, the ALJ concluded that the evidence provided did not establish the
criteria in Listing 1.04A. Proceeding under this analysis, the court found that
265
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Zellweger had the “residual functional capacity to perform light physical
labor.”271 The ALJ concluded in step four that Zellweger’s past work exceeded
his residual functional capacity but, in step five, determined that there were other
jobs in the economy that Zellweger could perform. 272 Based on this analysis, the
ALJ denied Zellweger’s claim for benefits.273
Following the denial, Zellweger sought review of the decision from the
court.274 The magistrate judge reversed the denial, ruling that “the ALJ's
discussion was too cursory at step three of the sequential analysis prescribed in
the agency regulations . . . the step in the decision process at which the ALJ is
tasked with assessing whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or
medically equals one of the Listings.”275 The magistrate noted that the ALJ
explained his reasoning in greater detail later in the decision, but noted that the
Chenery doctrine barred him from considering it. 276 After a motion for
reconsideration under Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
denied, the Commissioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 277
The court determined that the only issue in this case was whether the
magistrate properly applied the Chenery doctrine when reaching his decision. 278
It concluded that he did not because, although “Chenery generally confides a
reviewing court to the agency's actual rationale for its decision, not an after-thefact justification . . . nothing in Chenery prohibits a reviewing court from
reviewing an ALJ's step-three determination in light of elaboration and analysis
appearing elsewhere in the decision.”279 The court compared the present case to
Jeske, a very similar case of a per se disability claim where the ALJ analyzed step
3 briefly but continued his discussion in the next part of the decision. 280 In Jeske,
the court concluded that “a reviewing court does ‘not violat[e] Chenery’s
command by looking at the ALJ's more thorough discussion of the evidence’
elsewhere in the decision” because “the five-step decision process ‘comprises
sequential determinations that can involve overlapping reasoning,’ and ‘[t]his is
certainly true of step three and the RFC determination that takes place between
steps three and four.’”281
Applying the same reasoning to the current case, the court found that the
discussion in the RFC determination in Zellweger’s claim was detailed enough to
support the rejection of Zellweger’s per se disability claim. 282 Because there was
no substantive flaw in the analysis, the court dismissed Zellweger’s arguments. 283
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Holding
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the magistrate’s
decision based on recent precedent. 284 The court noted that in a similar case
involving the same listing, “the sequential process is not so rigidly
compartmentalized, and nothing in the Chenery doctrine prohibits a reviewing
court from reading an ALJ's decision holistically.”285 In this case, there was
ample evidence that the ALJ appropriately analyzed all relevant medical evidence
and elaborated on his cursory initial analysis in the step that addressed
Zellweger’s residual functional capacity. 286 As there were no other issues with
the ALJ’s decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. 287
Impact
This case provides further support to Jeske in promoting a less strict
reading of Chenery that allows ALJs flexibility in writing their opinions.
Previously, Chenery was fairly constrictive in forcing ALJs to fully explain their
reasoning for each step of their analysis, rather than allowing them to rely on later
reasoning to justify prior points. The common-sense approach exemplified in
these two cases will allow ALJs to write their decisions on these matters in a more
logical way, permitting them to be understood more readily by both courts and the
general public.
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